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Abstract 
This literature review seeks to provide a comprehensive and systematic 
review of evidence concerning decentralization and its impact on vulnerable groups 
through social protection (SP) programs with the specific case of Indonesia. Having 
explored six major databases with various keyword strings, the results lead to 
considerable gaps in the knowledge base for decentralization and social protection, 
particularly for cases in developing countries. Most of the literature is ‘data free’, 
based on theory, assumption, or conjecture. Four key issues have been generated out 
of extensive search results. First, the weak correlation and varied results of 
decentralization implementation and local service delivery. Second, the impact of 
decentralization on SP is unclear. Third, a country’s current regulatory 
environment and administrative capacity, significantly determine the overall success 
of SP programs. Fourth is the potential features of decentralization that can be 
drawn upon to enhance SP. 
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I. Introduction 
There is already a wide body of literature on the impact of decentralization 
and democratization on social protection (henceforth called SP) in developing 
countries. A number of important points can be observed out of the emerging 
consensus on the impact of decentralization and democratization on service delivery 
and the factors of importance in ensuring the implementation of social protection. 
Research from Shah and Thompson (2004) on the early phase of Indonesian 
decentralization conveys important findings that a lack of incentive or 
responsiveness of local governments to their residents inhibited the expected impact.  
This study seeks to assess the major issues arising in the implementation of 
SP within the context of decentralization and democratization through a systematic 
review of the literature. The review is based on electronic bibliographic searches and 
it draws on various types of literature.  
This paper is structured as follows: it provides a brief background to 
decentralization, democratization, and SP, before moving to outline the 
methodology used to search for, and review, the literature in this area. The following 
section presents a discussion of key issues emerging from this literature, focuses on 
Indonesia. The final section concludes with key messages. 
II. Theories of Democratization and Decentralization  
Democratization and decentralization have emerged as mechanisms for 
addressing a wide range of issues in public sector organizations around the world. 
They have also evolved as a consequence of much dissatisfaction with the results of 
centralized economic planning which then led reformers to decentralization to 
reduce the sizable control of the central government and induce broader 
participation in democratic governance (Smoke, 1994). One important assumption 
is that in being closer to the people, local authorities can more easily identify people’s 
needs, and thus supply the appropriate form and level of public services (Oates, 1972).  
Both democratization and decentralization can be regarded as highly 
controversial and contested activities that determine the locus of decision making 
power and disrupt established power relations. Likewise, Scott (2009) argues that 
decentralization is not a technical activity that takes place in a political vacuum. In 
a similar vein, Rees and Hossain (p. 582) further highlight that decentralization is 
more than a process associated with local government reform.  
Meanwhile, a large theoretical literature on democratization has developed 
considerably. In the last sixty years, this body of work has been joined by a vast 
array of empirical studies in modern political science.  
2.1. Decentralization: Concepts and Dimensions 
One of the most critical prerequisites to translate decentralization from 
theory to practice is a clear understanding of the concept in a definition. A quick but 
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thorough literature review from UNDP (1999) shows no single agreed definition of 
decentralization.  
The fundamental premise commonly held by development stakeholders is 
that a decentralized public sector will be more effective and accountable to the people. 
However, the rapid implementation of decentralization reforms often leads to 
several problems. According to Joanis (2014), most of the problems result from the 
coexistence of multiple tiers of government in certain policy areas. Many countries 
have begun delegating their responsibility for social services to lower levels yet the 
results have been mixed (Faguet 2014, pp. 8–9). In the case of Indonesia, political 
expediency led to ‘big-bang’ decentralization but left the expenditure law unclear on 
assignments which subsequently had to be revised.  
2.2. Driving Factors of Implementation 
In their initial objectives, many decentralization experiments aim to 
reconstitute government, from a hierarchical, bureaucratic mechanism of top-down 
management to a system of nested self-governments characterized by participation 
and cooperation. As summarised by Firman (2010), decentralization is aimed at 
diminishing the dependence of the local government on central government; 
encouraging economic development; to improve accountability; and to 
institutionalize change.  
Decentralization in Indonesia has opened up the possibility for grass-roots 
participation in the local political context and wider public participation. It has had 
diverse implications for the political changes desired by the people; at the very least 
it has allowed the discussion and debate on the idea of 'democracy' to flourish. The 
latest development, the restructuring of the election of leaders, is considered by 
many to be the culmination of this process of developing a 'grass-roots' democracy 
and good governance.  
A confluence of economic and political factors characterizes Indonesia’s 
experience of decentralization, as reported by Hofman and Kaiser (2006). They point 
out that economic and political upheaval following the crisis eventually triggered a 
‘big-bang’ decentralization process. The fiscal, administrative and political 
autonomy of local government has thus increased significantly in a relatively short 
period of time. More importantly, the government in 2005 took a major decision to 
introduce direct elections for the positions of the regent, mayor, and governor whilst 
retaining the central government greater powers to influence policy at the local level 
through direct spending (Bennet, 2010, pp. 8–9).  
Furthermore, regional proliferation—which is the by-product of 
decentralization—has caused a further disparity between regions. In many ways, 
Indonesia’s story was a portrait of ‘fixing the machine as it was running’. 
2.3. Modalities of Distributive Politics in a Decentralised and Democratic 
Regime 
Like markets, politics also distributes goods (see Booms & Halldorson, 1973). 
Government programs channel cash, jobs, credit, and a myriad of other resources to 
citizens; elected officials mete out benefits to favored constituencies, and political 
parties distribute everything from leaflets to souvenirs in search of votes. Politics 
can also manage to influence taxes and transfers to redistribute income within 
society (Bird & Zolt, 2005).  
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Within the setting of decentralization, regional governments have plenty of 
room to create various entitlement programs. Enhanced by the values of more 
liberal democratization, the political distribution of goods becomes increasingly 
important, particularly in a location with a large vulnerable population (Bollen & 
Jackman, 1985). Political authorities at different levels of government make choices 
about the distribution of goods to beneficiaries (Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 
1989). When the hold of these authorities on office depends on their winning 
elections, their choices become bound up with political strategies. Therefore, the 
modes of strategic distribution vary widely.  
Many conceptual distinctions can be drawn among distributive strategies. 
Stokes et al (2013) propose to distinguish programs generating public goods from 
ones targeting individuals. Public goods might benefit all contributors, or they 
might create a subsidy for public expenditures of narrower geographic 
constituencies (pork-barrel politics as suggested by Aldrich, 1995). Political parties 
can make long-term and slow-moving investments in basic programs by 
campaigning, on the margins, offering ‘tactical distributions’ (Dixit & Londregan, 
1996). Incumbents have the advantage of controlling benefits exclusively or they 
might be controlled if their opponents are economic monopolists (Medina & Stokes, 
2007). 
Figure 1 below depicts the categories of distributive politics with their 
different channels of distribution. As reiterated by Stokes et al (2013), there are two 
distinctions in distributive politics i.e. programmatic vis-à-vis non-programmatic 
distribution. The other important difference is between unconditional benefits and 
conditional exchanges. 
For a distributive strategy to be programmatic, according to Stokes et al 
(2013), two things must be true. First, the criteria for distribution must be public. 
Second, the formal criteria of distribution must actually shape the distribution of 
resources.  
 
Figure 1. Types of Distributive Politics 
Source: modified from Stokes et. Al., 2013 
As a corollary of decentralization, Indonesia embarked upon democratization. 
The first democratic election was held in 1999. Subsequently, the new format of the 
1) Are rules of distribution public?
2) Do publicised rules shape actual distribution?
Modes of Distribution
Yes
Programmatic politics
No; is receipt of benefit contingent on individual's 
political support?
Non-programmatic 
politics
Yes, Directed at whom?
Clientelism
Party members
Patronage
Voters
Vote Buying
Turnout Buying
No, are benefits targeted at individuals?
Partisan bias
Yes
Nonconditional 
benefits to individuals
No
Pork-barrel politics
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presidential election was held in 2004 to choose the president and vice president in 
one ticket. Furthermore, the country has held direct local elections, known as pilkada, 
since June 2005 (Chen & Priamarizki, 2014). The pilkada system allows citizens to 
directly vote for the more than 500 mayors and district heads and 34 governors. 
Direct Pilkada is considered as ‘one of the most important achievements of 
Indonesia's democratic reform’ (Fionna, 2015, p. 179). Prior to 2005, regional heads 
‘had been elected by provincial legislatures, giving elites ample opportunities to 
negotiate the outcome behind closed doors. The introduction of direct elections, by 
contrast, gave the final say in inter-elite competition in provinces to the electorate’ 
(Mietzner, 2012, p. 213). 
In spite of this, the Pilkada system had never been flawless. Various forms of 
patronage and clientelistic politics persisted and thrived. In many places, direct 
elections did not shake up the entrenched political traditions but resume the ‘New 
Order’ oligarchy (for a critical take on direct Pilkada from a pro-democratic point of 
view, see Choi, 2011). Despite these, experts concur that, in most instances, direct 
elections at local levels have led to greater participation from the ground.  
III. Concepts and Theories Underlying Social Protection 
Social protection (SP henceforth) is depicted as an important agenda and has 
been adopted by many national development strategies in recent years (Cook & 
Kabeer, 2009, p. 3). A number of factors explain this heightened interest: the 
growing awareness that economic growth alone cannot deliver broadened 
development goals. Considering the recent trend and the popularity of SP, 
Barrientos, and Hulme (2010, p. 6) argue that a wide body of literature suggests that 
SP is an effective response to poverty and vulnerability in developing countries. 
Undeniably, the definition of SP can be vague. There is an array of varying 
definitions which can lead to confusion. Increasing concern on the misused definition 
has been largely centered in a drift to a charity perspective, not a rights-based one 
(Standing, 2007, pp. 512–513).  
In addition, Brunori and Reilly (2010) question whether almost any public 
intervention could be considered more or less directly part of the SP system (p. 7). 
Using this perspective, large government interventions such as education policy, 
pension systems, health care, and many other development policies will fall under a 
broad definition of SP. This, in fact, may impede the understanding of its specificity. 
Furthermore, Bender (2013) notes that different definitions of SP exist, which is not 
simply a problem of different streams of research across various academic disciplines 
(p. 41) but largely a reflection of different histories, cultural traditions, and 
prevailing values.  
Evidence suggests that the focus of the term SP has been made to risk and 
vulnerability, which has an indirect contribution to poverty (Barrientos, Hulme, & 
Shepherd, 2005, p. 8). In a similar vein, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) argue 
against the popular perception of SP as social welfare programs for poor countries. 
Furthermore, their notion challenges the limited ambition of SP policy in practice, 
which has moved slightly from its origins in the ‘social safety nets’ discourse and 
aims to provide economic protection against livelihood shocks.  
Recently, a number of authorities have acknowledged the social component 
of vulnerability and the importance to incorporate consistent support to chronically 
poor individuals (Brunori & Reilly, 2010, p. 13). These considerations have found a 
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synthesis in wider definitions endorsed by a number of international institutions and 
academics.  
At this point, it is important to define SP and refer to the work of Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) that draws attention to distinctive conceptual and 
working definitions of SP. The former describes SP as public and private initiatives 
that provide assistance to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, 
and enhance the social status and rights of marginalized groups. They define SP as 
follows: 
“Social Protection is the set of all initiatives, both formal and informal, that provide: 
social assistance to extremely poor individuals and households; social services to 
groups who need special care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; 
social insurance to protect people against the risks and consequences of livelihood 
shocks; and social equity to protect people against social risks such as discrimination 
or abuse.” (p.9) 
Clearly, the above-mentioned SP definition is echoed strongly by many 
scholars and development institutions. For instance, Barrientos (2013) mentioned 
that SP is almost always associated with a range of public institutions, norms, and 
programs aimed at protecting people from contingencies. Broadly following the 
notions from ILO (2005), these can be grouped under three main headings: social 
insurance, social assistance, and labor market regulation. 
3.1. Dominant Paradigm  
In the past, SP programs are often perceived as the luxury of developed 
countries. Over the past 20 years, developing countries have embraced and adapted 
SP as an instrumental policy for achieving development goals. The speed of this 
expansion and the urgency of its ever-expanding aims has perhaps left limited room 
for reflection regarding the philosophical antecedents that underlie SP.  
The wide variety of SP programs that have emerged globally provides 
evidence that the rich and dynamic ideological, political and social settings into 
which new programs and institutions are introduced are pivotal to setting a course 
for SP development trajectories,  especially within the context of developing 
countries. However, as SP initiatives have expanded rapidly, practical issues related 
to legislation, targeting, financing, implementation, management, and technology 
often take the center stage.  
There are several features distinguishing an emerging paradigm in 
developing countries. Naturally, they have a strong focus on poverty reduction and 
on providing support to the poorest (Barrientos & Hulme, 2005), whereas in 
developed countries the emphasis of SP is on income maintenance and on protecting 
decent living standards for all, notably workers.  
Discourse on SP especially in lower-middle-income countries is still 
unfolding. Attention from development institutions remains high with the reports 
on specific issues of SP from the World Bank (2018) and its close relation to the 
achievement of SDGs as written by ILO (2017). Similarly, discussion among 
scholars has been showing critical attention towards wider aspects of SP as compiled 
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in IDS Bulletin on SP for social justice (2011), IDS Bulletin on ‘graduation’2 from 
SP (2015), and a special edition of Global Policy which discusses principles and 
practice of SP (2016). The most recent literature on SP points towards cross-cutting 
contemporary topics such as pre-empting climate risks in the long-term (Costella et 
al., 2017), how to build adaptive SP to mitigate climate-related extreme events (Béné, 
Cornelius, & Howland, 2018), how to provide trans-national SP for (undocumented) 
migrants and the role of sub-national governments (Dobbs & Levitt, 2017), how to 
design SP using experimentation (Hanna & Karlan, 2017). Coinciding with the 
process of democratization in many parts of the world is the dynamics of labour 
protest within the context of declining SP (Sil & Wright, 2018) while the effect of 
globalization proxied by trade volume and its impact on SP for the poor in 
developing countries is elaborated clearly by Desai and Rudra (2018). The evolution 
of SP and varied implementation in developing countries are discussed extensively 
using the most updated information by Yi (2017). 
The raison d’être of SP programs in developing countries can be traced back 
to the various crisis events and policy responses. For most parts of the history, the 
debate on social assistance has involved choices about whether the basic principle 
behind social provisioning will either be ‘universalism’, or selectivity through 
‘targeting’ (Mkandawire, 2005). Under universalism, the entire population is 
definitely the beneficiary of social benefits as a basic right, while under targeting, 
eligibility to social benefits involves some kind of means-testing to determine the 
‘truly deserving’ recipients. Policy regimes are hardly ever purely universal or 
completely based on targeting, they tend to lie somewhere between the two 
extremes on a continuum, and are often hybrid, but where they lie on this continuum 
can be decisive in spelling out individuals’ life chances and in characterizing the 
social order. Inevitably, as mentioned by Devereux (2016), targeting as a mechanism 
for allocating scarce public resources efficiently and equitably has come under 
sustained attack, for two main reasons: 1) the apparent impossibility of achieving 
perfect targeting accuracy; and 2) ethical reasons – social divisiveness and 
perceptions that excluding some people from benefits is socially unjust.  
3.2. Challenges to the Dominant Paradigm 
There has been a very rapid extension of SP programs in developing 
countries over the last decade. This has focused on social assistance, as opposed to 
social insurance or labor market regulation (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009) and has 
come in many forms: the introduction and extension of pure income transfers, such 
as non-contributory pensions or child based transfers; income transfers conditional 
on work, for example, public works or employment guarantee schemes; income 
transfers combined with services, such as conditional cash transfers or integrated 
social assistance schemes; and more recently, the development of integrated poverty 
reduction programs.  
In Indonesia, the World Bank (2012) has attempted to undertake the Social 
Assistance Public Expenditure Review which provides a thorough analysis of SP 
budget effectiveness. Findings on this report show a significant increase in public 
expenditure for SP although it is argued that further improvement could be made. 
The performance of local government was discussed in brief with particular 
 
2 Graduation in this publication means leaving a SP programme after reaching a 
wellbeing threshold, once the participant has acquired a set of resources that is 
expected to equip them for a higher-income future livelihood. 
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accentuation stress on the decreasing role of central government. The report also 
found that lack of legal clarity in technical guidance for sub-national government 
inhibits social assistance initiatives at the local level.  
Nevertheless, the role of local government as a primary stakeholder in 
implementing SP has been considered important. It is emphasized particularly in 
rural communities characterized by high levels of poverty, inequality in the land, 
social status, literacy and/or political power (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). Also, 
research from Sumarto (2013) reiterates the positive impact of establishing regional 
institutions for poverty reduction. Yet, important findings from Crook and 
Sverrisson (2001) reveal the limited responsiveness of local government to the poor, 
determined mainly by the politics of local-central relations.  
3.3. The Significance of the Concepts and Theories Underlying SP 
Since the inception phase of SP, the debate on how to deliver the benefits 
dominated the discourse. It became clear when subsidy had proven ineffective to 
reach the poorest group. Energy subsidies as a core policy instrument for stabilizing 
prices and protecting the general welfare of the population seemed irrelevant when 
transport costs depend not only on fuel prices but also on road infrastructure and 
the quality and availability of public transport (Perdana, 2014). The most important 
point lead to the ineffectiveness is that fuel subsidies have unequal distributive 
effects. Since there is no restriction on the purchase of subsidized fuel in retail outlets, 
every household, regardless of their welfare status, has a similar chance to buy 
subsidized fuel (Widodo, Sahadewo, Setiastuti, & Chaerriyah, 2012). This causes the 
subsidy to become regressive as Perdana (2014, p. 6) shows that high and upper-
middle classes consume more energy, and hence most of the subsidy allocation is 
enjoyed by these richer households. 
Opting for a targeted approach, government programs in Indonesia have 
been the subject of extensive studies seeking to identify the factors that ensure or 
hinder success in delivering SP programs. Such factors that have received a lot of 
attention recently include the determination of the poverty line. Although its 
methodology adopts acceptable standards, the national poverty line in Indonesia 
(almost equivalent to the international absolute poverty standard of $1.5 per day) is 
very distant from the income actually needed for a decent livelihood (Yusuf & Rum, 
2013). Therefore, the idea of increasing the standard to $2 per day for the 
international poverty line, which is comparable across countries in PPP terms, is a 
critical aspiration (Sumner & Edward, 2014).  
In a decentralized and democratic regime, political scientists usually refer to 
the theoretical findings of partisan attachments and distributive politics. This is 
undeniably relevant to the case of burgeoning SP in Indonesia after 2005 when the 
direct election was officially launched. Yet, many political analysts believe there are 
also low-level operative factors playing in the Indonesian political system (S. 
Hidayat, 2009). What has become the dominant view among theorists or analysts is 
similar to the practitioner’s rule of thumb: a party will not waste its resources on 
loyal supporters (or on die-hard haters), but instead spend on swing voters (Cox, 
2009). The main reason is that parties will use largesse to change people’s votes; 
swing voters, with no prior commitment to one party or another, will be uniquely 
responsive. 
With the weakening of aliran politics in Indonesia, the pragmatic approach 
of social policy distribution is emulated in every political party (Ufen, 2008). The 
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public often cannot distinguish between the differences in platforms between parties. 
Hadiz and Robison (2013) and Winters (2013) among other political scientists point 
out that the power of oligarchy has still not diminished, but rather has survived 
through different regimes in Indonesia. With deeply entrenched influence, political 
actors manage to utilize informal networks in their electoral area. Brokers 
undeniably play the most important role in garnering votes. 
On the eve of elections, candidates often assemble successful team members 
(anggota tim sukses) or volunteers (relawan) to distribute cash or benefits to the 
neighborhoods (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016, p. 5). Some benefits might be added if 
candidates manage to secure votes or win seats. Road improvement or 
infrastructures such as school building or housing are mainly built once candidates 
win the election. These days, candidates no longer rely on conventional benefits like 
cash, but they often promise to give more ‘sustainable’ programs.  
Health care and free education are the most popular agenda candidates 
usually pledge in their campaigns (Rosser, 2012; Rosser & Sulistiyanto, 2013). In 
this situation, there are attempts to move the focus away from regular elections to 
further strengthening of citizenship and democratizing the state by transforming 
citizens from passive actors independent relationships with politicians and political 
parties into active ones who can demand public goods provision from the state. 
Unfortunately, however, most of the entitlement benefits were not designed 
properly and lacked inputs from wider stakeholders. For instance, health care is 
offered generously without preparing the supply side in a lagged region (B. Hidayat, 
Thabrany, Dong, & Sauerborn, 2004). This ill-conceived strategy might backfire for 
the candidates as it will cause public dissatisfaction, eventually causing the vote to 
shift to other candidates or leading to reduced turnout. In a similar vein, some 
candidates who promised generous entitlement programs prior to elections decided 
to cancel mainly due to the fact that implementation would be unrealistic. 
IV. Scoping Study and Search Results 
This section presents the process of identifying and collating findings and 
important results using potential keywords in relevant academic journal repositories 
or databases. The process is undertaken through several steps. First, a scoping study 
attempts to revisit the connection between relevant keywords. Second, the study 
delved into an electronic bibliographic database and website search. Third, a 
supplementary component was prioritizing papers that resulted from previous 
extensive searches. These search results are presented briefly in this section. 
4.1. Scoping Study and Field Mapping  
The purpose of a scoping study is to identify possible interconnection 
between fields relevant to the literature review. In this paper, a scoping study is used 
to refer to a systematic classification of various topics that might intersect with one 
another. The diagram below illustrates some of the main potential keywords on each 
topic. It is apparent from the diagram that topics on decentralization, 
democratization, and SP are interrelated to several sub-topics which might be 
plausible for further elaboration. However, field mapping in these clustered topics 
must be attempted to seek specific topics that lie at the intersection of 
decentralization, democratization, SP, and local governance. 
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Figure 2. Field Map of Research Study 
Equally important is to identify technical keywords for investigating important sub-
topics. In this paper, sets of keyword strings are used to give initial guidance on 
systematic search. Keyword strings for each topic domain are provided in Table 1 
below. 
Table 1. Keyword Search Strings 
Topic Domain String 
No. 
Search Strings 
Decentralization 1 [decentrali*ation*] OR [devolution] OR 
[deconcentration] AND [“fiscal equali*ation”] 
Democratization 2 [democrati*ation] AND [election] AND [“local 
politics”] AND [“local election”] AND [“direct 
election”] 
Social Protection 3 [“social protection”] OR [“social security”] OR 
[“social assistance”] OR [“social insurance”] 
AND [“poverty reduction”] AND [“gender”] 
Local Governance 4 [accountability] AND [“good governance”] 
AND [“public sector reform”] AND [“capacity 
building”] AND [“service delivery”] AND 
[“intergovernmental coordination”] 
4.2. Electronic Bibliographic Database and Website Search Results 
An extensive range of economic and social databases was searched (Google 
Scholar, EconLit, International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBSS), SCOPUS, 
ASSIA, JOLIS), using several combinations of relevant search terms and Boolean 
logic operators over the period from January 1999 to January 2018. The detailed 
results are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 2. Search Results on Peer-Reviewed Literature* 
Keywords 
Google 
Scholar 
EconLit IBSS SCOPUS ASSIA JOLIS 
String No. 1 
[Decentralization] 
5,900 7,953 1,954 17,622 19,867 2,698 
String No. 2 
[Democratization] 
738 10,335 1,796 53,249 11,633 5,881 
String No. 3 [Social 
Protection] 
18,000 26,838 2,354 23,031 27,670 5,716 
String No. 4 [Local 
Governance] 
24 42,024 3,943 77,058 11,164 11,061 
String No. 1 
[Decentralization] AND 
Indonesia 
862 1,781 298 533 146 91 
String No. 2 
[Democratization] AND 
Indonesia 
261 1,568 246 556 47 50 
String No. 3 [Social 
Protection] AND 
Indonesia 
13,100 1,402 227 1,032 175 40 
String No. 4 [Local 
Governance] AND 
Indonesia 
2 2,782 333 544 188 28 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 
AND Indonesia 
2 408 42 184 19 6 
String No. 1 AND No. 3 
AND Indonesia 
35 297 62 54 20 1 
String No. 1 AND No. 4 
AND Indonesia 
5 586 35 118 47 5 
String No. 2 AND No. 3 
AND Indonesia 
3 175 44 23 17 1 
String No. 2 AND No. 4 
AND Indonesia 
2 663 71 51 22 3 
String No. 3 AND No. 4 
AND Indonesia 
17 324 64 16 27 6 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 
AND No. 3 AND 
Indonesia 
4 85 6 3 6 0 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 
AND No. 4 AND 
Indonesia 
1 262 14 20 13 0 
String No. 1 AND No. 3 
AND No. 4 AND 
Indonesia 
48 149 3 2 10 1 
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Keywords 
Google 
Scholar 
EconLit IBSS SCOPUS ASSIA JOLIS 
String No. 2 AND No. 3 
AND No. 4 AND 
Indonesia 
3 94 3 2 5 0 
String No. 1 AND No. 2 
AND No. 3 AND No. 4 
AND Indonesia 
4 69 1 1 4 0 
*) Search based on literature published 1999-2018 
4.3. Literature Search Results  
While the literature search resulted in an enormous number of studies, 
relatively few have been carried out that explicitly focus on the linkages between 
two topics or more. For instance, a search in EconLit came up with only 69 
references (in English) to decentralization, democratization, and SP with the context 
of Indonesia for the period 1999 to 2018. SCOPUS, the major multidisciplinary 
database of bibliographic information, came up with only a single hit on a similar 
string and period. A search in the JOLIS identified 91 hits under the keywords 
‘decentralization in Indonesia’, which became narrowed down to merely a handful of 
publications when the search was combined with other keywords combinations. 
The result above, with relatively few scholarly publications having explicitly 
studied linkages between keywords surrounding the topics of decentralization, 
democratization, and SP is reflected in the widely used volume of the Handbook of 
Fiscal Federalism edited by Ahmad and Brosio (2008). None of the articles included 
in the book deals explicitly with SP (one article focuses on decentralization and 
service delivery). The comprehensive readings on Decentralization Briefing Notes 
edited by J. Litvack and Seddon (1998) contain only one relevant article. 
This search on bibliographic databases yielded 120 possibly relevant ‘hits’ 
which were downloaded (abstracts where possible, titles otherwise) and reviewed. 
Of these only 14 were deemed relevant and the full paper obtained and reviewed. 
The websites together yielded 236 potentially important papers, which were 
obtained and reviewed. A review of the references contained within those papers 
yielded 56 additional papers for review. Thus, in total, 69 papers, articles, books, and 
reports were reviewed fully (marked by * in the reference list).  
4.4. Criteria for Prioritisation of Papers  
Papers in this area may have a broad or narrow focus, according to whether, 
for example, they focus on SP specifically or poverty more generally, whether they 
focus on the experience or viewpoint of a single country, a region, or more globally, 
and whether they focus on local governance specifically or decentralization more 
generally. Clearly, the relevance and importance of these papers to the specific issue 
of SP within decentralization will differ. Papers identified were therefore categorized 
according to three dimensions: 
1. Sector: concerned with decentralization generally or local governance 
specifically; 
2. Geography: specific to developing a country case or not; 
3. Social Protection Specificity: cover all types or concerned with a type of SP 
specifically. 
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These papers were then ‘priority rated’, according to these dimensions, as: 
1. High priority: papers specifically concerned with decentralization, 
democratization, and SP and were developing country-specific. For instance, 
Priyadarshee and Hossain (2010); Fossati (2016). 
2. Medium priority: papers concerned with decentralization more generally and 
were concerned with SP, but were not developing-country specific such as a 
paper by Ezcurra and Rodriguez-Pose (2009);  
3. Low priority: papers concerned with decentralization more generally and were 
not SP-specific. For example, see P. Smoke and Lewis (1996); The World Bank 
(2003a); Turner, Podger, Sumardjono, and Tirthayasa (2004); and von Luebke 
(2009). 
Only those papers rated as a medium or high priority were used as the basis 
for the discussion in this thesis (these are marked by # in the reference list).  
4.5. Key Issues Arising from Literature Review 
There are considerable gaps in the knowledge base for decentralization, 
democratization, and SP, particularly for case studies in developing countries. Most 
of the literature is ‘data free’, based on theory, assumption, or conjecture. This is 
critical because there is no time limitation on decentralization and democratization, 
meaning that one cannot turn back to an arrangement of centralization in the long 
run. Below are the most important issues arising from the search results. 
4.5.1. Mixed Impacts on the Relationship between Decentralization, 
Democratization, and Improved Local Service Delivery 
One basis on which to assess the impact of decentralization is local service 
delivery in the country under question. This is important for two reasons in 
particular. First, basic services, such as health, education, water, and sanitation are 
systematically failing and especially failing poor people. Services are failing because 
they are falling short of their potential to improve outcomes. Second, these services 
are consumed and provided locally as most of them are categorized as non-tradable 
goods and services. 
The Asia Foundation (from 2004) launched a series of studies to evaluate the 
impact of decentralization in Indonesia. Its findings suggest that early 
decentralization successfully promoted the establishment of three important 
conditions: (i) an increased awareness and respect for people's participation in the 
political process at the local level; (ii) a stronger commitment from local government 
to service delivery and significant pressure from communities to improve the quality 
of public services; and (iii) local governments working together and sharing 
information to solve problems together.  
Nevertheless, case studies from three districts conducted by SMERU (2002) 
revealed the finding that many areas impose new levies which could potentially 
hamper the local business climate. A World Bank report (launched in 2008) 
discusses that while the poverty headcount dropped significantly after 1999—even 
considering the reversal in 2005— service delivery indicators show a mixed picture. 
Some indicators have improved, such as the primary school enrolment rate, but 
many others have only improved slightly since 1999 and some not at all. Likewise, 
recent evaluation of newly created regions shows that performance indicators are 
still far from what one might expect (see special report on decentralization by World 
Bank, 2011). 
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4.5.2. Unclear Impact of Decentralization on SP and Poverty Reduction 
Inter-related connections between decentralization and SP have rarely been 
explored. The majority of studies have focused on observable effects of 
decentralization on public sector outputs such as investment levels, public service 
provision, education and health indicators, macroeconomic stability, and other 
larger threads (Faguet 2014). While several studies have attempted to evaluate the 
performance of anti-poverty programs under decentralization, few have analyzed SP 
programs as the primary object of study.  
None of the studies have looked at the impact of decentralization on potential 
beneficiaries or vulnerable groups (i.e. pregnant women, children, people with 
disabilities, elderly), with no analysis of local-financed SP program sustainability. 
Moreover, despite the potential of decentralized policymaking which enables higher 
female participation, understandings of social risks and gender inequality, in 
particular, have not been effectively integrated into SP policy and programming.  
The link between decentralization and its impact on poverty reduction is 
ambiguous and largely influenced by country specificities. Bardhan (2002) 
highlights the mixed empirical experience of poverty reduction with 
decentralization in developing countries. The proximity of local government to the 
people has not universally led to better service provision in rural areas, undermined 
by the problems in coordination and lack of capacity. Additional to these problems 
are local elite capture which reduces the effectiveness and quality of services 
reaching the poor (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).  
An evaluation by the World Bank (2012) of Indonesian SP programs 
maintains that local governments have merely invested small budget shares for SP 
expenditure which caused under-coverage and sub-optimal progress. The report 
also mentions another problem which potentially impairs implementation: 
conflicting regulations between central and local government. For instance, 
currently, there are no harmonized local and national regulations regarding 
Jamkesmas (national health insurance scheme), Jamkesda (local health insurance 
scheme), and the National Social Security Law (which calls for universal coverage of 
all citizens with five insurance products including health).   
Overall, the extent to which decentralization improves the quality of SP is 
unclear, but there may well be scope for mutual benefits when there are capable 
institutions, qualified personnel, and sufficient resources. It is relevant that capacity 
building is an important component of development (Fanany, Fanany, & Kenny, 
2009).  
4.5.3. The Regulatory Environment Determines the Impact of SP 
Newly formed authorities tend to promulgate their own regulations at the 
lower level. This is in line with the findings of Tanzi (1996) who stress the effects 
of decentralization that might cause excessive regulation. In addition to the general 
regulatory environment, important are those regulations that are directly pertinent 
to SP, as this sector tends to be amongst (if not the) most over-regulated. This can 
lead to a situation where regulations might be conflicting or overlapping, resulting 
in ineffective coordination and weak managerial control. 
With regard to the Indonesian context, Law 32 the Year 2004 gives 
responsibility to local governments for the welfare provision. Therefore, local 
authorities are expected to have more comprehensive knowledge regarding their 
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citizens. However, most resources are still under the control of the central 
government. For instance, although district governments were put in charge of 
managing (and operating) public health facilities when decentralization started in 
2001, the central government is still involved in the deployment and financing of 
health personnel who work under civil service contracts (Olivia & Yamauchi, 2012). 
Meanwhile, several social insurance programs require specific conditions 
which can only be operated under a centralized arrangement. For instance, social 
insurance works only through the principle of the ‘law of large numbers’ by pooling 
funds from all participants to share risks as stipulated in Law 40 Year 2004 on 
Indonesian National Social Security System (Hadiz, 2004). The current regulatory 
environment will, in addition to that specifically related to SP, determine the 
effectiveness of programs in the decentralized setting. Important here is the 
harmony in terms of legal frameworks between a national regulatory system and 
regional laws, such as clear roles and responsibilities of regional stakeholders in 
nation-wide social insurance programs, particularly on issues such as benefit 
portability and standardization (Arifianto, 2006). 
4.5.4. The Potential of Decentralization and Democratization to Improve 
SP outcomes 
Most decentralization problems in Indonesia, as in many other developing 
countries, are related to governance issues. Decentralization in Indonesia has left 
much-unfinished business largely due to its hasty implementation (Sumarto, 
Vothknecht, & Wijaya, 2014). Institutions are lacking key requirements for an 
effective management process i.e. absence of performance measures and an effective 
framework of constraints; unclear division of responsibilities between the different 
levels of government; insufficient human and institutional capacity of local 
governments; inappropriate incentives given by the structure of decentralized public 
finance.  
It cannot be denied that decentralized Indonesia has made progress in 
addressing absolute poverty. There is confirmation of convergence in poverty rates 
at the district level (Sumarto et al. 2014, p.3). It clearly indicates that regions with 
initially higher poverty levels tend to experience a greater reduction in poverty.  
Although SP programs have recently only had a few real champions among 
local leaders and bureaucrats, positive cases of local leadership signify the potential 
of responsive administration and local capacity to empower society and transform 
livelihoods (see evidence of Surabaya in Weiss, 2013).  
Theoretically speaking, regional governments are supposed to have a better 
idea and knowledge of the needs of their people, ensuring that strategies meet local 
needs. In light of this premise, there are four determinants of local governments’ 
ability to implement SP programs. Firstly, the capacity for income generation at the 
local level. Although the major source of local revenue comes from central 
government transfers, several local governments are able to generate their own 
income. The presence of natural resources in the region is a key factor affecting the 
amount localities can generate.  
The second determinant is the performance in the delivery of public services. 
As fiscal capacity varies between regions, technical capacity also differs significantly. 
Several regions are still lagging behind due to the limitation of infrastructure.  
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Third, are the governance aspects of decentralization. A strong 
accountability chain within a decentralized system is key to managing actors 
between institutions in the same region (horizontal coordination) and between 
central and local government (vertical coordination). Fourth is the regional 
institutional capacity for reducing poverty. Almost all districts are required to 
establish regional poverty reduction coordinating agencies (Tim Koordinasi 
Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah, TKPKD), but around 20 percent of all districts 
have not yet established a TKPKD office as of 2010. This implies that many local 
leaders do not consider poverty reduction to be a foremost priority in their 
development plans. Sumarto (2013) provides an early claim that districts which 
established TKPKDs reduced poverty more significantly compared to regions 
without them.  
V. Conclusion  
In this paper, an attempt was made to provide a balanced review of the 
literature concerning SP in the context of decentralized and democratized 
governance, providing an overview of key issues that face developing countries. 
A sizeable number of recent studies have focused on the exacerbation of 
inequality as a consequence of regional disparities. Interestingly, rarely has a 
significant attempt been made to clarify the impact of decentralization and 
democratization on SP. However, evidence on the likely impact of SP is virtually 
non-existent. Perhaps due to this, most of the literature is speculative about what 
might happen, rather than empirically-supported or verifiable, with views naturally 
quite polarised between those arguing for and against the benefits of decentralized 
and democratized government.  
Although the limited time frame and the nature of the study imply that any 
conclusion should be treated with caution, our analysis indicates that four issues 
arise in terms of researchable areas: First, the weak correlation and varied results of 
decentralization implementation and local service delivery. This is because of a lack 
of systematic or comparative evidence and methodological problems which often 
lead to inconclusive results. Second, the impact of decentralization on SP and 
poverty reduction is quite unclear. Decentralized governments have to equip 
themselves with proper structure and adequate resources. Leadership factors are 
also instrumental in navigating the enhancement of local SP programs. Third, a 
country’s current regulatory environment and administrative capacity will 
significantly determine the overall success of SP programs. The key here is 
establishing the likely balance of ‘power’ between national regulatory systems and 
local regulations. Although several programs embed ‘monopolistic’ characteristics, 
this does not exempt the significant role from regional-level players. Fourth, it is 
worth pointing out potential features of decentralization that can be drawn upon to 
enhance SP. Success stories and lessons learned from several regions indicate the 
potential of responsive local leaders in empowering society and transforming 
livelihoods through SP and participatory public policy (Lewis, 2014). 
All in all, improved local governance can be associated with short-term action 
while in the long run governance needs to redesign intergovernmental transfer 
systems. Finally, given the data vacuum that exists with respect to the impact of 
decentralization on SP more specifically, there is clearly a substantial research 
agenda to be pursued before one can begin to better understand the relationship 
between decentralization, democratization, SP, and development outcomes. 
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